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While the impacts of climate change are being felt by people and communities now, 
many of the most severe impacts will be felt in the decades to come. This presents 
significant barriers to achieving long-term development objectives – particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa, a region with low capacity to adapt to the future impacts of 
climate change. Factoring medium- to long-term climate information into investments 
and planning decisions is therefore an important component of climate-resilient 
development. 
We know little about how climate information is used in Africa to make decisions with 
long-term consequences, or how effective it is. We know even less about the barriers to – 
and opportunities for – using climate information in decision-making. How, then, should 
governments, businesses and donors strive for climate information to achieve Africa’s 
long-term development objectives? 
The Future Climate For Africa (FCFA) programme explores these questions and seeks 
to challenge many of the assumptions that underlie them. To guide the programme, 
six case studies investigated how climate information was being used in decision-
making in sub-Saharan Africa. These comprised four country case studies: Malawi, 
Rwanda, Zambia and a combined study of Accra, Ghana and Maputo, Mozambique; 
and two desk-based studies focused on long-lived infrastructure in the ports sector 
and the large hydropower sector. This report presents the results of the scoping 
phase. 
How could climate information help African decision-makers achieve their 
long-term development objectives?
One important conclusion is that not every investment and planning decision needs 
to be taken on the basis of medium- to long-term climate information. Nevertheless, 
climate information helps to guide the sustainability and effectiveness of many long-term 
development objectives. Investments and planning activities in sub-Saharan Africa can 
generally be characterised as follows: 
 y Short-term interventions with short-lived implications. These interventions are 
typically focused on addressing immediate development needs; their impacts are 
largely limited to the project cycle – rarely extending beyond 5 years.
 y Short-term interventions with long-lived implications. These interventions 
are focused on immediate, short-term development needs, but their impacts on 
infrastructure and livelihoods can be felt long after the programme ends – typically 
beyond 5 years.
 y Long-term interventions with long-lived implications. These interventions focus 
on both short- and long-term development needs. Impacts on infrastructure and 
livelihoods extend over decades.
Many development activities in sub-Saharan Africa fall under the first category, but 
it is the second and third that have the strongest need for medium- and long-term 
climate information to be considered within the decision-making. Examples of this are 
large ports and dams, health care systems and school infrastructure.
School, Kigali, Rwanda











Why isn’t climate information currently being used for long-term 
development planning?
The FCFA case studies find few examples of climate information being meaningfully 
integrated into the planning of long-term development objectives – despite the large 
number of decisions with long-lived implications. Why is this? There are many reasons, but 
three stand out: 
1. The immediacy of short-term development challenges in many sub-Saharan African 
countries inevitably focuses decision-makers’ attention on shorter timescales.
2. Medium- to long-term climate information is often ill-suited to informing the local 
economic, social and environmental considerations that dictate investment trade-offs in 
Africa, owing partly to uncertainties at high-spatial resolutions and a lack of integrated 
assessments of climate impacts, vulnerability and adaptation across much of Africa. 
3. There is a communication mismatch between the producers and users of climate 
information. The information delivered to decision-makers is often overly technical, 
ill-suited to their needs, and can easily lead to a misunderstanding of the associated 
uncertainties. Likewise, decision-makers’ needs are rarely fed back to science producers. 
A lack of effective boundary organisations to act as intermediaries among scientists, 
policy-makers and practitioners remains a clear gap. 
What opportunities are there to support the greater use of climate 
information?
Targeted investments are needed to better integrate science into decision-making and 
support the capacity of African climate science, its researchers and its institutions. There are 
several ways to do this:
1. Support Africa’s climate observation network and build the capacity of scientific 
institutions. Significant opportunities exist to increase the quality and quantity of Africa’s 
observation networks and infrastructure, and digitise the large swathes of unarchived historical 
data that are currently inaccessible to many researchers. There are also opportunities to support 
the capacity of African climate scientists and relevant scientific institutions. Although some 
international and regional centres provide capacity support to a handful of regional scientific 
and meteorological centres, these investments are currently limited in scope and size.
2. Improve the usefulness and relevance of climate information. One of the clearest 
demands from the decision-makers consulted during the FCFA scoping phase was the need 
for sector-specific impact analyses that weigh up the implications of various policy options. 
Greater support for region-specific integrated assessment modelling and, where relevant, 
strengthening its use among decision-makers, may promote an evidence-based approach 
to long-term decision-making. Enhancing the accuracy and communication of near-term 
decadal climate predictions1 may also offer advantages in providing information that can be 
acted upon within the timescales relevant to many decision-making processes. However, 
these tools should be used carefully, given the scientific and technical challenges that remain.
3. Recognise and overcome political and institutional barriers. Many of the biggest 
barriers to using climate information relate to institutional mandates, hierarchical structures 
and a lack of adequate incentives. Investing resources – time and money – to assess the local 
political context and engage with local partners can lead to more effective communication 
and better use of this information. This requires a shift away from short funding cycles, Mine workers, Zambia




rigid targets and donor-driven agendas, towards longer-term partnerships that embed 
interventions within national policy processes.
4. Help decision-makers to make robust decisions despite uncertainty about the 
future climate. Despite considerable advances in our understanding of the climate system, 
large uncertainties are likely to remain, regardless of future investments in climate science. 
It is vital that there is more understanding about the limits of climate information. Helping 
decision-makers to select and use systematic, evidence-based approaches that acknowledge 
this uncertainty is important. 
What can we learn from the approaches used by the FCFA teams?
The FCFA scoping phase provided insights into the ways in which scientists and policy-
makers can be brought together to discuss climate information. The case study workshops 
highlighted several points, including:
1. Longer-term engagement among donors, knowledge brokers, and science users 
and producers is needed to achieve meaningful policy impacts. One-off activities such 
as workshops are a common approach to capacity building and knowledge-sharing, but they 
rarely lead to effective and sustained learning and action. To arrange and facilitate a workshop 
effectively, the organisers need to understand the local institutional and political contexts well. 
2. Knowledge brokers should consider carefully whether a workshop is the optimal 
form of engagement. While traditional workshops can allow for effective discussions and 
the sharing of ideas, all six case studies showed that workshops must be well designed and 
facilitated to lead to meaningful engagement among different stakeholders. In addition, 
expectations of financial compensation for attendance can negatively affect who and how 
many people choose to attend. 
What are the ethics of promoting medium- to long-term climate 
information in decision-making?
Promoting the use of climate information in long-term decision-making raises important 
ethical questions. Experiences from the case studies indicate that prioritising long-term 
development perspectives is often at odds with addressing existing efforts to meet 
basic human needs and find pathways out of poverty. Even in the case of longer-lived 
infrastructural investments and plans (such as hydropower dams, or spatial design and urban 
planning), high discount rates, short political time-horizons and large uncertainties reduce 
the incentive for accounting for long-term climate change. 
Should donors, governments and knowledge brokers be pushing for the inclusion of medium- 
to long-term information in development planning where decision-makers have expressed 
a clear desire to prioritise immediate development concerns? How should external actors 
engage with decision-makers in places where there is little knowledge of, or enthusiasm for, 
the inclusion of medium- to long-term climate information in planning? Sadly, few donors, 
development agencies or governments are willing to address these questions. Above all, the 
organisations and people responsible for developing and communicating climate information 
should be aware of the social value of the information they provide, and the legitimacy of 
the goals pursued by policy-makers. It is important that they adhere to principles of honesty, 









Chapter 1. The FCFA scoping phase
Factoring climate information into the design and implementation of long-term 
investments and planning decisions is vital to climate-resilient development.2 This 
is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where the impacts of climate change on 
development outcomes are likely to be significant and long term.3 Yet we know little 
about how climate information is used across the region to make decisions with long-term 
consequences, or how effective it is in guiding investment decisions. We know even less 
about the barriers to, and opportunities for, the uptake of climate information. It is these 
questions and assumptions that the FCFA programme aims to explore, test and challenge.
FCFA is a 5-year international research programme jointly funded by the UK’s Department 
for International Development and Natural Environment Research Council.4 The 
programme supports research and capacity-building activities that foster better 
understanding of climate variability and change across sub-Saharan Africa, and promote 
the use of long-term climate information in decision-making over different time frames 
(see Box 1). 
FCFA works on the premise that producers of climate information must be supported 
in improving our understanding of sub-Saharan Africa’s climate system. However, more 
accurate and precise climate information is unlikely to improve decision-making on its 
own. How climate information is communicated to, and used by, decision-makers will 
be of equal, if not greater, importance in making Africa’s development more climate-
resilient. Wider factors, including political-economy issues, governance arrangements, and 
responses to other drivers of development and environmental change, also need to be 
considered. 
The programme’s 18-month scoping phase investigated real-world adaptation challenges 
to explore how climate information is used. The country case studies examined were: 
Malawi, Rwanda and Zambia, and a combined urban case study in Accra, Ghana and 
Maputo, Mozambique. Two desk-based case studies focused on long-term infrastructure: 
ports and large hydropower. These studies tackled questions such as: what types of 
investments and planning decisions are likely to be affected by climate change in the 
longer term? Is climate information being considered in such decision-making processes, 
Box 1. Time frames for climate information and decision-making
This report describes time frames in relation to decision-making and climate information. Neither has 
universally agreed definitions but to avoid confusion, we use the following:
 y For decision-making by governments, civil society or non-governmental organisations (NGOs): ‘short term’ 
refers to a time frame of less than 1 year; ‘medium term’ refers to 1–5 years; and ‘long term’ refers to more 
than 6 years.
 y For climate information: ‘short term’ refers to the seasonal characteristics of the climate up to one year in 
duration, typically associated with 3-month seasonal outlooks and El Niño Southern Oscillation forecasts; 
‘medium term’ is 1–10 years in timescale and includes projections that fall under the remit of initialised 
decadal projections (although these are rarely useful for decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa); and 
‘long term’ refers to multi-decadal climate information, typically associated with the Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) or long-term trends in historical observations. 





and in what format? How can scientists and policy-makers be brought together to 
promote the better use of climate information, in policy and practice? 
This report synthesises the key lessons from the scoping phase, reflects on the activities 
undertaken, and uncovers the opportunities and barriers to the effective use of climate 
information to achieve long-term development objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.1 Case studies and methods
The six case studies in the FCFA scoping phase were selected to ensure a diverse range 
of geographical, political and economic contexts, as well as reflecting a wide variety of 
adaptation challenges (Figure 1).
The research methods included semi-structured interviews, desktop research, and multi-
stakeholder workshops and meetings. Each case study is briefly summarised below. For 
further information about the activities and research methods used, and the specific 
outcomes from each case study, please refer to the full technical reports.5 
Urban adaptation: Accra and Maputo
Project coordinators: University of Cape Town, South Africa; START, USA; Stockholm Environment 
Institute, Sweden
This case study brought together groups from Accra, Ghana, and Maputo, Mozambique, 
in a participatory workshop held in Accra. Participants from both cities considered a 
common adaptation challenge: how can large coastal cities contend with increased flood 
risk? The team piloted a novel ‘co-exploration’ approach to adaptation decision-making, 
in which facilitators and participants collaborated to explore the vulnerability of a specific 













place to various climate and non-climate stresses. This approach used responses to wider 
development issues, such as urban planning and drainage, and asked the participants to 
use information on climate impacts to narrow the options down so that they were climate-
resilient. The assessment process was used to develop draft policy recommendations and 
city-specific messages on climate change adaptation.6 
Food security, disaster risk management and social protection: Malawi 
Project coordinators: Kulima Integrated Development Solutions, South Africa; University of Leeds, UK
This case study focused on food security, disaster risk management and social protection. 
Interviews with government and non-governmental stakeholders explored the current 
nature of decision-making processes and policy-making across these sectors. Alongside this, 
the team conducted an assessment of the use of climate information for long-term planning. 
A multi-stakeholder workshop used role-play and simulations of development situations to 
help participants identify the differing needs of farmers, planners, community workers and 
other information users, as well as new opportunities to work with them. A ‘serious game’ 
examined the role of uncertainty in climate predictions, with groups ‘paying’ for information 
with varying degrees of certainty within a disaster-management scenario. These activities 
encouraged participants to discuss how they make decisions in their current role, and raised 
questions about the climate information that is most relevant to them.7
Climate fund management, hydropower investment and social protection: Rwanda 
Project coordinators: Global Climate Adaptation Partnership, UK; Met Office, UK
This case study looked at the adaptation challenges relating to the management of Rwanda’s 
environment and climate change fund, hydropower investments and social protection 
activities. The approach differed from the others. Instead of a consultative workshop, bilateral 
meetings were held with key stakeholders in these sectors. The aim was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the needs of specific information users. A detailed assessment of existing 
literature and a review of Rwanda’s information needs were conducted prior to these 
meetings to allow the team to identify the most relevant stakeholders.8
Transport infrastructure, health, agriculture and environment: Zambia 
Project coordinators: Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, Netherlands; Met Office, UK
The Zambia case study promoted dialogue among and between decision-makers 
and climate scientists. Interactive workshops held in Livingstone provided a forum for 
stakeholders to present the adaptation decisions they confront in their work, and share ideas 
about the types of information that are most relevant and usable. During the first workshop, 
held in June 2014, participatory games helped attendees to understand medium-term 
climate projections. These were then used to define criteria, protocols and decision-support 
mechanisms for turning science-based information into recommended courses of action. 
A second workshop, in September 2014, sought to communicate these earlier results and 
match users’ needs with information provided by the UK Met Office.9 
Long-lived infrastructure in Africa
Integrating climate information into the planning, implementation and maintenance of 
long-lived infrastructure (infrastructure built to last for a long time) is extremely important, 
particularly given the scale of financial investments and length of operational time frames 
for these projects (which often span decades). Through a review of existing literature and 
informal engagement with relevant experts, the scoping phase produced two reports 
on the use of climate information for ports10 and large hydropower schemes in Africa.11 Sogloulou dam, Cameroon





The main objective was to provide evidence of the risks and opportunities that climate 
change presents, and the use of climate services to inform decision-making with long-lived 
consequences in Africa (see Box 2).
1.2 Synthesising the lessons learned from the scoping phase
In order to compile, compare and synthesise the insights gathered during the scoping phase, 
the authors carried out a series of analyses. First, to learn from the case studies, we analysed 
the six technical reports from the case studies, as well as other written outputs from these. 
Second, we gathered qualitative information about the approaches used, based on semi-
structured interviews and feedback from case study teams, as well as further interviews with 
the individuals consulted during the case studies and participant observations, both before 
and after the in-country activities. Third, preliminary assessments and lessons learned were 
presented at a validation workshop held in Cape Town, South Africa. Representatives from all 
four country teams attended this, gave their feedback and helped to identify the main lessons 
learned.12 
The rest of this report presents the synthesised findings of these analyses, including key 
messages for scientists, decision-makers and climate-information users, in sub-Saharan Africa 
and beyond. 
Box 2. Climate information and climate services
In this paper, we define ‘climate information’ as the collection and interpretation of climate-related data. Climate 
information can consist of the analysis of, among other data: historical observations of the past and current 
climate; future projections over multiple timescales, typically achieved through various climate- and earth-system 
models; and climate impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation options, which require information and analysis from 
the fields of economics and other environmental, social and political sciences. 
Making climate information accessible, timely and relevant can help countries cope with current climate 
variability and limit the economic and social damage caused by climate-related disasters. Climate services do 
this through the interpretation, communication and use of climate information to inform decision-making. 
Climate services ensure that the best available climate information is effectively communicated to people 
working in sectors such as agriculture, water and health, so that they can develop and evaluate mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. Climate services also allow communities to build their own resilience to future climate 
change and take advantage of opportunities provided by favourable climatic conditions. To be effective, climate 








Chapter 2. How could climate information help 
African decision-makers achieve their long-term 
development objectives? 
Key messages
 y Through the effective use of climate information, decision-makers can make investment 
and planning decisions that are proactive, durable and robust. Effective use of climate 
information also minimises the risk that decisions will adversely affect – or increase the 
vulnerability of – other systems, sectors or social groups.
 y Long-term climate information is not necessary for every development initiative, but it 
will be crucial to the sustainability and effectiveness of many targeted investments and 
planning decisions (particularly long-term investments with long-lived implications). 
This chapter examines the rationale for using climate information to make decisions about 
long-term investments and projects. Then, building on examples from the case studies, we 
look at different situations in which it is appropriate to use this information.
2.1 The rationale and guiding principles for using climate information in 
decision-making
The importance of using climate information to guide decision-making is founded on two 
issues related to the efficiency and effectiveness of planning and investment decisions. First, 
understanding climate change and its potential impacts enables projects to be planned and 
designed in such a way that they can adapt to these changing conditions in the future. By doing 
this, countries can minimise the losses that climate change might cause, and take full advantage of 
any opportunities it may offer. This helps to ensure the longer-term sustainability of investments or 
decisions, and avoids decision-makers choosing development paths that will limit future options. 
Second, using long-term climate information can protect countries from making decisions in one 
sector that might damage other systems, sectors or social groups, or increase the vulnerability of 
people and communities – a process known as ‘maladaptation’ (see Box 4, page 18).13 
The World Resources Report in 201114 highlighted the importance of climate information for 
decision-making in the context of change and uncertainty, outlining a number of principles 
for its effective use. The report argues that for climate information to be relevant, it should be:
 y user-driven, taking into account inter-cultural considerations, and therefore of practical 
application to communities, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders
 y sufficient in scope and scale to draw effective conclusions for plans and policies, and to 
make clear the uncertainties, limits and available opportunities
 y accurate enough to support risk and vulnerability assessments, and help define what levels 
of risk can be accommodated
 y accessible to those who need it to adjust their actions or behaviour
 y supported over the long term and frequently updated, since many climate impacts will 
take place over decades
 y cost-effective, given that limited resources are available to support information-
management systems
 y targeted to specific risks, vulnerable populations and ecosystems, in order to avoid 
information overload. 






A wide range of investments and planning activities take place across sub-Saharan Africa 
and these occur on different timescales. Decision-making relevant to the use of climate 
information can be thought of as a continuum (see Figure 2), which includes the following 
situations:
1. Short-term interventions that address immediate development needs. These 
interventions are typically focused on addressing immediate development needs, 
and impacts are largely limited to the project cycle. Rarely is climate change a specific 
objective of programmatic outcomes, although the intervention may contribute to 
reducing the impacts of current vulnerability and supporting the adaptive capacity of 
people and communities, such as the distribution of free mosquito nets or post-disaster 
humanitarian activities.
2. Short-term interventions with long-lived implications. These interventions are 
typically focused on immediate and short-term development needs. In some cases, 
infrastructure and impacts on livelihoods can be felt long after the programme, and 
extend well beyond 5 years. Given the prolonged impact, and implications for long-term 
adaptive capacity, climate change may affect the continued effectiveness of sustained 
activities. Examples include the development of 3–5 year national development plans, or 
social protection schemes that provide social safety nets (such as insurance) to vulnerable 
populations. 
3. Long-term interventions with long-lived implications. These investments, and 
more importantly the infrastructure and planning decisions behind their delivery, are 
typically high in cost and targeted at addressing both immediate needs and long-term 
economic and social objectives. Examples include building a large port or hydropower 
dam. Given the long timescales for the investments and use of the infrastructure, climate 
change is likely to have an impact on the effectiveness of these interventions.
Many development interventions in sub-Saharan Africa fall under the first category – 
short-term interventions. Unsurprisingly, the FCFA scoping phase found few examples of 
medium- to long-term climate information guiding short-term interventions, as climate 
information is deemed unnecessary for the successful delivery of such projects. An 
example of this may be an intervention aiming to distribute food, mosquito nets and water 
purification tablets to combat the spread of an outbreak of malaria. Here, the short-lived 
nature of the support and infrastructure provided, and the immediacy of the problem 
at hand, mean that medium- to long-term climate information is unlikely to match the 
timescales and needs of the intervention. However, the case studies identified a range 
of contexts under categories 2 and 3 in which the integration of medium- to long-term 
climate information may be deemed appropriate (see Box 3, page 13). 
Mombasa port, Kenya
















Potential to contribute to ineffective, failed or maladaptive strategies without effective use of climate information
Primary focus Addressing immediate 
development needs
Addressing immediate and 
short-term development 
needs
Addressing both short- and 
long-term development 
needs
Duration and impact of 
investments
Largely limited to project 
interventions. Core impacts 
rarely extend beyond 5 years
Infrastructure and impacts 
on livelihoods can be felt 
long after the programme, 
and typically extend well 
beyond 5 years
Infrastructure and impacts 
on livelihoods extend over 
multiple decades
Current use of long-term 
climate information
Low Rarely incorporated into 
project design
Limited. Actions rarely 
translate from policy and 
design into implementation
Opportunities to 
promote uptake of 
climate information
Few opportunities. Most 
relevant for weather 
and short-term climate 
information
Modest opportunities. 
Medium- and long-term 
climate of pontential 




with the time horizons 
of multidecadal climate 
projections
Principal challenges for 
uptake of long-term 
climate information
Time horizons of medium- 
and long-term climate 
information rarely match 
the length of impact of 
interventions
Principally relevant to 
medium-term decadal 
forecasting, though scientific 
techniques and applicability 
to decision-making remain 
unproven. Institutional 
barriers, and not seen as a 
political priority
Uncertainty of long-term 
climate information, 
poor-quality historical 
observations, and challenges 
in integrating into decision-
support tools. Institutional 
barriers, and not seen as a 
political priority
Labadi beach, Accra, Ghana





Box 3. In depth: How climate information can help achieve long-term development goals
Short-term interventions with long-lived implications
Many different activities fall under this category, including the strengthening of basic health-care systems 
and infrastructure, women’s empowerment schemes and 3–5 year national development plans. While each 
is concerned with the delivery of services and support for people’s immediate and short-term needs, the 
impacts of individual interventions on livelihoods and wellbeing (and the infrastructure they may leave 
behind) frequently continues for many more years. 
Several of the FCFA case studies identified social protection programmes as an example of an intervention 
that falls within this category. Schemes such as Malawi’s Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme, 
which distributes cash transfers to vulnerable members of the population, provide valuable and timely 
financial contributions during time of hardship, with significant potential to support people’s adaptive 
capacity to climate change.15 The contributions of social protection schemes, in their many different forms, 
can often be felt many years down the line, typically long after the scheme’s completion. 
However, the effectiveness of social protection programmes may be compromised by a changing climate 
either by damaging the long-term assets that people have built up (this is particularly the case for 
infrastructure built by large public works programmes), or by increasing the number of people who require 
support to cope with the changing frequency and intensity of climate-related shocks. Social protection 
may also inadvertently promote maladaptation by perpetuating livelihood activities that are unsustainable 
in the longer term due to changing risk profiles.16 
Thus, medium- to long-term climate information can play an important role in guiding relevant elements 
of the design and implementation of social protection schemes, while still recognising the scheme’s 
central objective of addressing immediate vulnerability to shocks and stresses. Indeed, Malawi’s Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development identifies weather and climate information as crucial to the delivery 
of the country’s social protection schemes, given the high dependence on agriculture for livelihoods 
and the economy.17 Despite this need, climate information has yet to feed into decision-making for, and 
the delivery of, social protection schemes in Malawi – a fate shared by many of the interventions in this 
category that were explored during the FCFA case studies (see Chapter 3). 
Long-term development interventions with long-lived implications
Long-term development plans provide one of the clearest entry points for the uptake of medium- to long-
term climate information. This is due to their strong role in determining the type, timescale and location 
of a country’s investment decisions, in both the public and private sectors. Rwanda’s ‘National Strategy 
for Climate Change and Low Carbon Development’ is one of Africa’s most advanced efforts to integrate 
climate change into national, sectoral and district development plans and budgets, and includes an 
operational fund for climate-related activities, known as ‘FONERWA’. Nevertheless, the integration of long-
term climate information is hindered by decision-makers’ lack of confidence in projections about future 
climate change, and the limited baseline knowledge regarding the impacts and risks of future climate 
change.18 
Other relevant examples of long-term interventions include investments in large-scale infrastructure. 
Potential lifetimes range from 30 years for new irrigation projects, 45 years for major urban infrastructure, 
60 years for large dams, through to 90+ years for bridges. As such, the use of climate information when 
planning these investments is of considerable relevance, particularly as efforts to retrofit infrastructure are 
often technically difficult and costly.19 Not only that, but the period used to calculate financial returns on 
the investment are also more consistent with the timescales associated with multi-decadal projections. 







The ability for medium- to long-term climate information to be of practical use in large-scale infrastructure 
projects is greatest during the planning phase, fading quickly during the design phase and becoming much more 
difficult during construction and operation. For example, in the last few years, Ghana has experienced severe 
energy shortages, according to Lumbroso (2014):20 “These are largely a result of low water levels and capacity 
problems at the existing Akosombo Dam on the River Volta, which supplies around 60% of Ghana’s electricity. To 
increase Ghana’s generating capacity, the construction of the Bui Dam hydropower scheme (on the Black Volta 
River) commenced in 2007.” 
“The Chinese Government agreed to loan US$622 m. to cover the construction of the dam and power station. 
In April 2007, the Ghanaian Government signed an agreement with Sino-Hydro, the Chinese company that 
is constructing the 400 megawatt scheme. But the project’s environmental analysis failed to consider the 
potential for climate change to reduce the dam’s power output. The International Water Management Institute, 
in conjunction with the Ghana Dams Dialogue, proposed further assessments of the Bui project’s impacts and 
the likely implications of future climate change on its operations. Despite this, owing to the delayed nature of 
the oversight and the pressures for completion that overshadowed the project, no amendments were made in 
progressing plans for the dam’s construction.”21
Inevitably, economic, political and social factors also play a considerable role in determining the use of climate 
information in guiding investment choices. These factors are explored in greater depth in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 3. Why isn’t climate information 
currently being used for long-term development 
planning?
Key messages
 y The FCFA case studies identified very few long-term decision-making processes that 
currently use climate information to inform the planning and delivery of investments. 
 y Political and socioeconomic factors can play a major role in determining the uptake of 
climate information in decision-making with long-lived consequences. These include 
political cycles and political time horizons, institutional structures and vested interests 
among decision-makers. 
 y The use of long-term climate information in sub-Saharan Africa is often constrained by the 
low quality or limited accessibility of the data, as well as a lack of capacity to interpret and 
apply information to decision-making contexts. 
 y There is a clear gap between the capacity of climate scientists to produce policy-relevant 
information and decision-makers’ need for such information in sub-Saharan Africa.
 y The role of communicating climate information is usually given to formal scientific bodies, 
such as national meteorological agencies. However, the climate information that reaches 
end users is usually overly technical, ill-matched to their demands and easily leads to 
misunderstanding of the uncertainties associated with it.
After 18 months of literature reviews, workshops, bilateral meetings and reports, what 
lessons can be learned from the FCFA scoping phase? What did the FCFA scoping phase 
find to be the barriers to the use of long-term climate information in decision-making? More 
importantly, what can be done to overcome the barriers, and improve communication 
between climate scientists and policy-makers? Using core findings from the six FCFA 
case studies, this chapter identifies the common challenges relating to the generation, 
dissemination and uptake of climate information in sub-Saharan Africa. 
First, the studies found that very few of the decision-making processes investigated currently 
use climate information to inform the planning and delivery of long-term development 
initiatives. This conclusion rings true across all sectors, whether social protection plans, 
disaster risk management or agricultural investments. While a number of planning processes 
refer to multi-decadal climate projections, primarily to make the business case for action (i.e. 
why it would be good for businesses to prepare for climate change), the case studies found 
little evidence of climate information being meaningfully used in the design and, more 
importantly, the implementation of planned activities. 
To some extent, this is not surprising. Many decision-makers in sub-Saharan Africa prioritise 
the delivery of shorter-term development objectives. However, the case studies observed 
similar deficiencies in informational uptake, even for investments that are traditionally 
associated with multi-decadal timescales and climate impacts, such as large-scale 
infrastructure and long-term development plans. 
Why is this the case? Two reasons stand out. The first relates to the political economy of 
climate change and long-term decision-making. The second revolves around how science is 
produced and communicated, its links with policy and practice, and the challenges of making 
decisions under considerable uncertainty. In the rest of this chapter, we explore both of these 
reasons and provide specific examples.






3.1 The political economy of climate change and decision-making
Political and socioeconomic factors can play a major role in determining the uptake of 
climate information in long-term decision-making.22 Political cycles and time horizons (i.e. 
the length of time politicians are in power), institutional structures within governments, and 
vested interests among decision-makers all influence the process of integrating science into 
policy. However, these are rarely acknowledged or addressed by climate-related actors. 
Three themes stand out from the findings from the FCFA scoping phase: i) a need to recognise 
the interactions between climate change and wider drivers of environmental and development 
change; ii) the ability to identify which types of decision should take climate information into 
account, and which need not; and iii) the influence of power, politics and timing. 
Recognising the interactions among climate change and wider drivers of 
environmental and developmental change 
Many sub-Saharan African countries are undergoing significant social, economic and 
demographic changes. Climate change is likely to directly influence these, but its impacts 
will often affect wider drivers of development indirectly (e.g. in the form of rising food prices 
or enhanced competition for scarce natural resources). More importantly, high vulnerability 
to current climate stresses in many countries mean that decision-makers focus primarily on 
the immediate impacts of climate change, as well as other immediate development needs 
(as explained in Chapter 2). This inevitably pushes long-term climate change down the policy 
agenda – and with it the use of climate information for decisions with long-term consequences. 
Despite this, many initiatives aimed at promoting socioeconomic development can, whether 
intentionally or not, play a central role in tackling the root causes of vulnerability to climate 
change. For example, in Zambia the National Climate Change Secretariat and the ‘Pilot Project 
for Climate Resilience’ are seen as the most prominent actors driving the climate agenda 
forward. Yet other initiatives and investments, by a wide range of civil society and private sector 
entities in Zambia (most notably mining and real estate developers), are playing a central role in 
determining the vulnerability and ability to adapt to climate change of different social groups. 
Such companies’ activities are overlooked in high-profile national climate change planning.23 
With this mind, any consideration of climate information in long-term decision-making has to 
recognise the role and interplay of climate change with wider drivers of development. 
Urban adaptation challenges also highlight the interrelationships between climate and non-
climate stresses. Alongside rising sea levels and temperatures, Accra and Maputo both face 
challenges including rapid population growth, expanding areas of unplanned settlement, 
and increased pressure on critical infrastructure (particularly drainage systems). For long-
term climate information to be of use, climate change must be tackled in an integrated way 
alongside these broader development challenges. 
Projections of future climate trends alone will not serve decision-makers’ needs. Rather, 
multi-sectoral and integrated assessments, which show how climate, socioeconomic and 
environmental factors are likely to interact, can add considerable value to the information 
provided and be used to inform decision-making processes. 
Climate information is not needed for all decisions  
Evidence from FCFA’s scoping phase demonstrates that, with regard to climate information, 
decision-makers are mostly interested in weather and seasonal forecasting. This is largely due 
to the perceived utility of this short-term information for achieving immediate development 
objectives, such as agricultural extension services and national early warning systems. Where Jamestown, Accra, Ghana





longer-term climate information is in use, it tends to be in relation to understanding historic 
trends and the impacts of short-term climate variability on decision-making in coming years 
(typically on 1–5-year time frames). 
In the Rwanda case study, we explored the use of climate information in five sectoral 
activities: social protection programmes; the national climate fund; hydropower investments; 
national agricultural planning; and urban planning. In nearly all cases, the climate information 
used to guide decision-making was extremely basic and presented as qualitative narratives 
that rationalised action on climate change adaptation. For instance, climate change will 
lead to future increases in the incidence and intensity of floods and droughts; therefore, 
investments are needed in water storage and resource management. Often a single 
emissions scenario (a projection of future climate change, depending on different levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions and changing social and economic factors in the coming years) 
was used, with little consideration of alternatives and uncertainties. This is partly due to 
limited available resources and constraints with regard to the technical capacities needed 
to understand, apply and disseminate such information among and between scientists and 
policy-makers. The principal issue, however, is that most projects focus on reducing existing 
vulnerabilities, rather than dealing with future risks.24
The immediacy of development challenges in many sub-Saharan countries inevitably forces 
the attention of decision-makers to think and act in shorter-term time frames. Indeed, it is the 
case that not every development decision requires long-term climate information to be taken 
into account. As long as development investments are reducing vulnerability and supporting 
poor people’s capacity to adapt to current climate variability, there are few incentives to take 
long-term climate change into account. 
This is even the case for some infrastructure investments. Returning to the Rwanda case 
study, the team found that the incentives for considering medium- and long-term time 
frames are low for micro-hydropower schemes, largely due to the short payback time of the 
investment; typically, schemes will provide a return on investments in less than 10 years.25 
While there is more potential for considering long-term climate change in larger schemes 
(i.e. those greater than 50 megawatt capacity), even here there is a trade-off. Decision-makers 
must weigh up increases in the immediate capital costs needed to ‘climate proof’ a scheme 
against the reduced benefits of the scheme if climate change reduces its effectiveness. 
Increased upfront costs for climate-proofing will yield future benefits towards the end of the 
scheme’s economic lifetime (the period for which the scheme costs the country money), 
although such benefits are well within the technical lifetime, and the calculus is hampered by 
the uncertainty around future climate change.26 
The fact that climate information is not currently embedded into all decision-making 
processes does not diminish the importance of promoting its use in relevant investments 
and plans. Indeed, all six FCFA case studies highlighted investment decisions that did require 
planning on longer time frames, such as urban planning, service delivery and long-term 
growth strategies. A failure to adequately incorporate climate information into the design and 
delivery of these runs a clear risk of maladaptation and ‘lock-in’ (see Box 4).
Power, politics and timing
The prominence of climate change in, and the uptake of climate information into, 
national planning and decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa, is dependent on three 
interrelated areas of political economy: i) support from powerful actors and stakeholders; 
ii) the structure of governance arrangements and institutional incentives; and iii) the 
ability to take advantage of appropriate windows of opportunity. 






With regard to the first point, action on climate change within national policy and 
programming in sub-Saharan Africa has mostly been coordinated through ministries of 
environment and natural resources management, or their equivalents. While this may be 
logical given their thematic relevance and formal mandates, in practice these ministries 
are often weak and under-resourced. 
Indeed, the case studies highlighted that effective national action on climate change, 
and the uptake of climate information into decision-making, is often dependent on more 
powerful ministries being mandated and given incentives to act on climate change. In 
Rwanda, climate change was adopted into core development priorities at an early stage, 
primarily driven by the enthusiasm of a powerful champion: President Paul Kagame. Under 
his leadership, the country has initiated its own high-level strategy, the ‘National Strategy 
for Climate Change and Low Carbon Development’, and has recognised climate change as 
a key cross-cutting issue in national economic development planning and subsequently 
sector plans. President Kagame’s enthusiasm has also facilitated a strong role for senior 
– and therefore powerful – ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning.29
Timing is also central to the uptake of climate information in long-term decision-
making. Long-term planning, by its nature, seeks to address the needs and objectives 
of people and investments over many years. Thus, ensuring that planned activities are 
informed about potential future risks and opportunities from the outset helps to ensure 
the sustainability of planned outcomes and prevent maladaptation in development 
trajectories.30 This is particularly true for the longer-term impacts of climate change, given 
the uncertainties associated with future projections and the slow onset of many climate 
impacts.31 
With this in mind, emphasis is often placed on long-term planning to ensure processes 
of reflective learning and to take a cyclical, iterative approach to decision-making.32 
However, the long-term development plans identified in the FCFA case studies had limited 
windows of opportunity for consultation during their design and implementation. Most 
importantly, firm targets are often set at the start, with little room for changing these 
during the project cycle. In Malawi, the longest time frame for government decision-
making is 10–15 years, through its ‘Vision 2020’. Although this document alludes to 
climate change objectives, long-term climate information is currently not used to guide 
Box 4. Understanding maladaptation and ‘lock-in’
‘Maladaptation’ refers to a process that results in increased vulnerability to climate variability and change, 
directly or indirectly, and/or significantly undermines capacities or opportunities for present and future 
adaptation.27 This is of particular concern with regard to investments that reduce people’s vulnerability in 
the short term, but ultimately increase their vulnerability in the long term, for example if investments are no 
longer suitable to future conditions and exacerbate resource scarcities, or increase exposure to climate risks. 
‘Lock-in’ is a particular feature of maladaptation in which the wrong types of intervention today can ‘lock’ 
societies into a development path that makes them vulnerable for decades to come. For example, an 
intervention that promotes water-intensive agriculture would be detrimental if the climate becomes drier 
over time, but it could be difficult to reverse, for example if indigenous knowledge and technologies were lost. 
Similarly, an intervention that encourages people to migrate to coastal cities could put more people at risk 
from coastal flooding.28





projects and policies. The case study also found no evidence of ministries using longer-
term climate information in current decision-making.33 Since the current Vision is nearing 
its end, the development of its successor is under way. This presents an opportunity 
to embed climate information into an influential long-term development strategy. If 
this is missed, there is a risk of coming up against considerable institutional barriers in 
encouraging uptake later on. 
3.2 The limitations of climate information 
The FCFA scoping phase highlighted a clear mismatch between the capacity of climate 
scientists to produce policy-relevant information, and decision-makers’ unrealistic 
expectations about the information they could receive. This is a fundamental constraint to 
the use of climate information in long-term decision-making. Coupled with this is a lack of 
effective communication and engagement between the users and producers of climate 
information, which leads to misunderstandings about the merits and limitations of its use. 
The quality and accessibility of data
Overall, sub-Saharan Africa’s climate observation networks and systems are poor, 
particularly compared to Europe and North America’s. Where networks and infrastructure 
do exist, many are in relative decline due to a lack of national and international leadership, 
investment and technical capacity.34 
Participants in each of the four country case studies cited sparse data coverage and 
temporal gaps as reasons why climate information was not more widely used for decision-
making with long-term consequences. In some locations, time series data (observations 
made regularly over a period of time) have been, and continue to be, disrupted by natural 
disasters and conflict. Accurate observations are crucial for assessing the validity of the 
outputs from climate models, particularly at high spatial resolutions. 
An inability to access data is another significant barrier, as highlighted in both the initial 
scoping workshops and the literature reviews. Since the 1980s, meteorological agencies in 
sub-Saharan Africa have been encouraged to sell their data to raise the revenue needed 
to maintain their observational networks. As a result, many are still reluctant to make data 
freely available for non-commercial purposes such as public policies for climate change 
adaptation.35 
There are several reasons for the limitations in capacity of African climate science. The 
development and refinement of climate models typically take place outside Africa. Africa 
does have internationally renowned centres for climate analysis and modelling, such as 
the University of Cape Town’s Climate Systems Analysis Group (CSAG) and the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), both in South Africa, the Africa Centre for 
Meteorological Applications for Development in Niger, and the IGAD Climate Prediction 
and Application Center in Kenya, among a handful of others. But only CSAG and CSIR have 
the capacity and funding to support regional modelling of long-term climate change, 
with many of the others focusing predominantly on weather and seasonal forecasting. A 
representative from the Department of Disaster Management Affairs in Malawi stated that 
the country’s decision-makers do not use long-term climate scenarios in their long-term 
planning due to resource constraints. According to the Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Development, there is no advance forecasting capability within the country’s Department 
for Climate Change and Meteorological Services.36 
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Capacity to interpret and apply climate information
In addition to the insufficient quality of climate data, case study informants also cited a lack 
of capacity and willingness among potential users to access, understand, process and act 
upon available climate information. This is partly due to resources and technical constraints 
within key decision-making bodies (such as local governments and national-level ministries), 
but also reflects the fact that the majority of policy interventions are focused on immediate 
needs and few decision-makers see the value of accounting for medium- to long-term 
climate information in investment and planning processes. This confirms the need for climate 
information to be available in forms that are useful and relevant to end users.
In Malawi, for example, the existing national structures to coordinate weather and climate 
information between the Malawi Meteorological Service and other line ministries function 
well. But case study informants noted the need for a better understanding of climate change 
generally among decision-makers, and the risks it poses. Various departments reported 
limited capacity to understand weather and climate information, identifying a need for 
capacity building and training on climate change and its potential impacts, as well as how 
to integrate medium- to long-term information into existing policies and decision-making 
processes. There was no evidence of ministries using longer-term climate projections or 
climate scenarios in current decision-making, even though regionally downscaled climate 
scenarios were available.37 The implication is that only limited climate information is being 
used to build the case for particular government investments and actions, rather than being 
informed by all the available information. The Rwanda case study also revealed a tendency 
among decision-makers to avoid considering uncertainty, even where this information is 
provided – this was often dismissed by decision-makers as “too complex”.38 
Decision-making in light of uncertainty 
Projections of future climate inherently come with uncertainties. Decision-makers often 
use these as a basis for disregarding potential future risks, or for delaying decision-making. 
The scale of the climate data available can be a factor in this uncertainty. Many case study 
participants emphasised the need for higher-resolution climate projections at local scales 
(known as downscaling), to provide information specific to a particular district, or even a 
town or city. Many model projections are currently available at relatively low resolutions. For 
example, most general circulation models (GCMs), such as those used in the CMIP5 model, 
generally operate at a horizontal resolution of 100 km or greater. While coarse resolution 
is useful in exploring longer-term feedbacks, understanding localised impacts, trends in 
extreme events and better projections on decadal time frames will require the downscaling 
of GCMs to resolutions in the region of 25–50 km. These are the geographical scales of 
interest to decision-makers, and providing climate information on regional or country levels 
could increase its use in policy processes. 
However, downscaling is a complex process. Projections at the local, subnational and national 
levels are generally more uncertain than global projections. Projections of climate change in 
Rwanda, for example, are hampered by the high heterogeneity in terrain and climate, as well 
as the lack of long-term data to validate model outputs. Much research is already underway 
to improve the quality and availability of downscaled projections for sub-Saharan Africa, 
but the time and resources involved should not be underestimated. The challenge will be 
to focus efforts on the geographical areas and processes that matter most. Also, without 
improvements to, and better validation of, the global models that feed into these downscaled 
models, the robustness of downscaled projections is limited. 
Despite the high demand for downscaled data, there is little appreciation among decision-
makers about the increased levels of uncertainty associated with these projections. This Makola market, Accra, Ghana





highlights the need for a better understanding of the uncertainty inherent in different types 
of climate information. For example, the Rwanda case study found that in almost all the 
cases examined, very few end users made use of medium- to long-term climate information. 
Where it was used, the information was basic and ignored uncertainty in both scenarios and 
climate models. A common theme mentioned in case study interviews and documents was 
that climate change will increase droughts, but the original sources highlighted that future 
drought patterns were unclear – uncertainty that had been lost during the communication 
process. When questioned about why this uncertainty was omitted, most users made 
reference to time, resource and capacity constraints. Many also stressed that including 
uncertainty was too complex and detracted from being able to make concrete policy 
recommendations. 
Uncertainty is unavoidable when dealing with climate projections on decadal timescales, and 
decision-makers need greater support and tools for making decisions under this uncertainty. 
In general, observations of increasing temperature are relatively consistent but projected 
changes in precipitation are more uncertain. Projections of changing rainfall patterns are of 
particular interest to decision-makers in countries that are dependent on natural resources, 
agriculture and tourism. In several regions of sub-Saharan Africa, notably East Africa, there are 
discrepancies between recent observations – which show a clear drying trend in ‘long rains’ 
– and models that predict a steady increase in precipitation.39 While these differences require 
further investigation, such uncertainties can have major implications for adaptation decisions. 
This demonstrates a significant challenge in communicating the complexity of climate 
science and building confidence in modelling data. 
Plenty of tools exist to support robust decision-making in the face of this uncertainty, but 
many of these are heavily conceptual, providing few recommendations that decision-makers 
can act upon.40 As acknowledged at the Accra–Maputo workshop, there are limits to applying 
climate model data in a way that recognises the chaotic nature of making real-life decisions 
about risk management and future planning. Tailoring these tools to suit the needs of 
decision-makers in sub-Saharan Africa, and finding ways to clearly communicate long-term 
climate information, including uncertainty, will be a useful step forward. Equally important 
will be finding ways to better understand the drivers behind uncertainties in models, and 
helping decision-makers to understand that inaction in the face of large uncertainties is 
often ineffective and costly. Several participants in the Malawi workshop highlighted the 
importance of indigenous knowledge and the potential to link this with scientific forecasts, as 







Chapter 4. What opportunities are there to 
support the greater use of climate information?
Key messages
 y There are opportunities to increase the quality and quantity of climate observation 
networks and infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the most achievable tasks is 
to recover the large swathes of unarchived historical data that are not yet digitised and 
therefore inaccessible to many researchers.
 y Climate scientists and national scientific institutions in sub-Saharan Africa need support to 
disseminate their long-term climate information, and to develop robust tools to identify the 
investments and decisions that are likely to need screening for risks from climate change.
 y Barriers to the uptake of climate information include institutional mandates, hierarchical 
structures and a lack of adequate incentives. A clear understanding of local political contexts 
is needed to make the communication and use of climate information more effective.
 y Embedding climate information into important development decisions often boils down 
to creating the right ‘sales pitch’: promoting the usefulness of climate information in the 
quantities that decision-makers value most.
 y There is a need to help decision-makers understand what climate information should 
and should not be used for, and to encourage more systematic and evidence-based 
approaches to decision-making under uncertainty.
The scientific and political barriers to the more effective use of climate information in long-
term decision-making appear great, but few are insurmountable. In investigating adaptation 
challenges in different sectors, the six FCFA case study teams considered how to make the 
use of climate information more effective. How can climate information be more embedded 
in targeted investments and planning decisions? What tools and processes can be used to 
bring science producers, science users and decision-makers together for more effective and 
meaningful dialogue? 
This chapter explores these questions in relation to the case studies and reflects on entry 
points for promoting the uptake of climate information in sub-Saharan Africa more widely. 
Opportunities are categorised under the following headings: investing in sub-Saharan Africa’s 
ability to generate, understand and use climate information; improving decision-support 
tools and methods; and developing the mandate and capacity of ‘boundary agents’ and 
knowledge brokers (i.e. the institutions that act as intermediaries among scientists, decision-
makers and practitioners). 
4.1 Investing in the ability to generate, understand and use climate 
information in sub-Saharan Africa 
Targeted investments are needed to support climate science in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
includes building the capacity of climate scientists and institutions, and improving channels 
for science to be integrated into decision-making. To begin with, the coverage of climate 
observation data networks across much of sub-Saharan Africa is poor, particularly when 
compared to Europe and North America (see Section 3.2). This presents a significant 
opportunity to increase the quality and quantity of observation networks and infrastructure, 
as well as recovering large swathes of unarchived historical data that has not been digitised 
and is inaccessible to many researchers. Institutes in sub-Saharan Africa are also making 





progress in the use of satellite and remote sensing data to complement, correct and fill in 
gaps where necessary. 
Not only will these investments help to establish robust baseline data for past and current 
climates, they are also essential for validating the outputs from climate models and correcting 
for systematic biases – one of the key factors limiting the use of climate projections in African 
decision-making. Indeed, the Malawi case study highlighted that high-resolution climate 
projections (i.e. downscaled regional climate models) are what decision-makers desire most, 
as these relate to the geographic scale of the majority of decision-making processes, such as 
a community, city or sub-region (see Chapter 3). 
This demand for data generation creates opportunities to support the capacity of climate 
scientists and relevant scientific institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. Technical and financial 
support to strengthen the capacity of national scientific institutions to interpret and 
disseminate medium- to long-term climate information is provided by several international 
and African organisations, such as the UK’s Met Office and the University of Cape Town in 
South Africa, but these investments are limited. Far greater engagement and support are 
needed (see Section 3.2).
Coupled with these investments is a need to improve the usefulness and relevance of climate 
information across sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed previously, the FCFA end users clearly 
articulated the need to improve the development of, and for greater access to, sector-specific 
impact analyses that weigh up the implications of various policy options. Such integrated 
assessment models (IAMs) combine: the social and economic factors that drive the emission 
of greenhouse gases; the bio-geochemical cycles and the atmospheric chemistry that 
determine how those emissions affect the climate; and the resultant effects of greenhouse 
gas emissions on our climate, ecosystems and human welfare.41 Although IAMs are 
commonly used to inform policy in other regions, few are tailored specifically to sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is a gap: regionally specific IAMs for Africa are needed alongside a strengthening 
of the capacity of decision-makers to integrate IAMs and other scientific decision-making 
tools into investment and planning decisions. This must be done carefully, though, as there 
are inherent uncertainties and limitations to sector-specific impact analyses. Decision-makers 
must be aware of this when drawing concrete conclusions, particularly for adaptation policies 
at the local level.42 
A second opportunity identified through the case studies is the potential utility of consistent 
and standardised national projections of climate change that can guide policy actions across 
a range of national bodies – government, civil society and the private sector. An example of 
where this has worked effectively is the UK Climate Projection models (such as UKCP02 and 
UKCP09). These create tailored impact- and adaptation-related scenarios and adaptation 
toolkits for decision-makers in the UK, covering a range of possible outcomes. The Malawi 
and Rwanda case studies suggest that, while an African equivalent at the same scale and 
technical level is not currently feasible, such tools could (if tailored to the national context 
as well as decision-makers’ needs) enhance countries’ capacity to build and analyse relevant 
scenarios and strengthen links with boundary agents (see Section 4.3).
Another interesting area of opportunity relates to near-term decadal forecasting. The 
magnitude of internal and decadal climate variability may rival that of anthropogenic 
climate change at regional scales over the course of the next 10–30 years.43 As a result, 
initialised decadal predictions could provide important information for many management 
and adaptation decisions – particularly those that fall under the categories of short-term 
investments with long-lived implications and long-term investments with long-lived Maputo harbour, Mozambique






implications.44 Enhancing the accuracy of decadal climate predictions may therefore help to 
provide information that can be acted upon within the timescales relevant to many decision-
making processes in sub-Saharan Africa.45 
In particular, the Malawi and Zambia case studies show that there is considerable demand 
from decision-makers for products that can inform decisions on 1–10-year timescales, 
particularly for informing the various long-term development strategies adopted by many 
sub-Saharan African countries (such as Malawi’s ‘Vision’ documents). However, we must be 
cautious when expanding the use and communication of decadal projections given the 
scientific and technical challenges that limit this new field of research.46
Investing in a better understanding of political and institutional contexts 
Promoting the uptake and use of climate information is not just about improving the quality, 
coverage and dissemination of climate science. Alongside the knowledge and capacity gaps 
that exist, many of the barriers to its uptake relate to institutional mandates, hierarchical 
structures and a lack of adequate incentives. 
The FCFA hydropower case study illustrates this clearly. The location of hydropower dams is 
an example of a long-term infrastructure decision that ought to benefit from incorporating 
long-term climate information. However, in practice, the siting of dams in sub-Saharan Africa 
“is often a process dominated by political and fiscal considerations, lobbying, corruption 
and compromise”.47 Isolated external efforts to promote the uptake of climate information 
are unlikely to succeed without meaningful and sustained relationships among knowledge 
brokers, science producers, and users and decision-makers at all scales. In contrast, spending 
time and resources on understanding the local political context, and engaging with local 
partners, can help funders and knowledge brokers to communicate climate information more 
effectively and embed their activities within ongoing local and national policy processes.
The effectiveness of climate information is also largely dependent on the bottom-up demand 
for and – where possible – national ownership of available climate services. This may require 
a rethink of current approaches to funding climate-related programmes in sub-Saharan Africa 
and keeping them in operation: shifting away from short funding cycles, rigid structures and 
targets, and donor-driven agendas, and moving towards longer-term partnerships between 
international and national partners. 
The need for political champions to promote the usefulness of climate information
An understanding of the political and institutional contexts within which decisions are made 
is key to supporting the uptake of climate information in national development objectives. 
Although each country is different, there are always ways to capitalise on political windows of 
opportunity. 
First, high-level ‘champions’ can play an important role in driving the climate agenda forward. 
Such champions are often vital in gaining legitimacy for climate change discussions and 
overcoming political obstacles to the use of climate information. The Rwanda case study 
highlights how President Kagame’s strong backing for national action of climate change, 
alongside involvement from relevant ministries, led to climate change being at the heart of 
the country’s development planning processes (see Section 3.1).48 Few sub-Saharan African 
countries have similar champions, unfortunately. 
Second, the engagement of high-level champions often boils down to creating the right 
‘sales pitch’: promoting the usefulness of the uptake of climate information in terms of 
quantities that decision-makers value most. For example, a sales pitch could demonstrate Boys fishing, Malawi





how climate information will increase decision-makers’ understanding of how certain 
long-term investments will affect their country’s economic growth, productivity, and the 
protection and creation of livelihood opportunities. 
Climate scientists cannot deliver this information alone. As mentioned previously, there 
needs to be a multidisciplinary approach that engages economics, social and environmental 
sciences. While such integrated assessments inevitably bring even larger uncertainties with 
them, and can dilute the business case for action, they will help to make the information 
more relevant to the immediate interests of decision-makers in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mainstreaming climate information into the policies and plans that matter
Mainstreaming climate information has been, and continues to be, the mainstay of national 
action on climate adaptation.49 Mainstreaming efforts have concentrated on supporting 
adaptation through large, internationally guided initiatives, such as the ‘National Adaptation 
Programmes of Action’ and the ‘Pilot Project for Climate Resilience’. While these initiatives 
may raise the profile of climate issues nationally, they are largely targeted at attracting 
international finance from multilateral funds for adaptation priorities. Few have gone on to 
ensure that adaptation, and with it the uptake of climate information, is embedded into core 
development planning. 
For the most part, adaptation still falls under the mandate of weaker line ministries, such 
as those responsible for the environment and natural resources management. Experience 
across the six FCFA case studies suggests that it is only when influential line ministries, such as 
those for economic growth and development, have the incentive and responsibility to act on 
climate-related issues that effective national action occurs. 
Yet this is seldom the case. Those with the requisite influence and technical capacity to set 
national agendas are largely disengaged, or lack the capacity to integrate climate information 
and climate impact assessments within planning decisions. For example, the Malawi case 
study highlighted that the longest time frame for political decision-making is 10–15 years. 
Led by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, planning under the country’s 
‘Vision 2020’ informs the country’s long-term development priorities. However, as noted in 
Section 3.2, during interviews, planners from this Ministry stressed that they “don’t yet use 
climate change information for timescales of 5 years or more when appraising new projects 
or policies”.50 They are, though, accustomed to economic modelling over a 10–15-year time 
period, using scenarios of population growth, and see the potential for incorporating climate 
change projections into these models to identify where climate change could limit long-term 
economic growth. This could help to prioritise investment decisions.51 
It is precisely these ‘Visions’ and long-term growth strategies, alongside the 3–5-year 
development plans that feed into them, that are the best opportunities for promoting the 
uptake of climate information into the planning decisions that matter most. These planning 
processes are central to national development objectives, and set targets and indicators 
for sectoral activities and investments. As a result, they can be used to create the incentives 
needed to promote the effective use of climate information in long-term decision-making. 
4.2 Improving decision-support tools and methods 
Across each of the various FCFA case studies, participants cited the high levels of uncertainty 
about climate projections and impact modelling as one of the principal obstacles to the 
uptake of climate information. Despite considerable advances in our understanding of the 






drivers of the climate system and its various components, these uncertainties are likely to 
remain, regardless of future investments – and may even increase as we seek to develop 
products that capture the more complex elements of, and feedbacks between, the natural 
and human systems.52 It is imperative that decision-makers understand what climate 
information should be used for, and what it should not, to foster more systematic and 
evidence-based approaches to decision-making under uncertainty. This requires simple tools 
that help them in making their decisions.
Simple tools for decision-making under uncertainty
There is a range of decision-support tools already in operation. These include the following 
economic decision support tools: cost-benefit analysis, real-option analysis and iterative 
management. Each has its own uses, tailored to particular problems and levels of uncertainty. 
For example, for short-term investments (especially those with high upfront capital 
investments) where there is an existing adaptation deficit, real-option analysis is potentially 
useful. For long-term investments in conditions of low adaptation deficit, iterative risk 
management may be more applicable. Cost–benefit analysis, a tool commonly used to assess 
the merits and limitations of different policy options, requires climate risk probabilities to 
be well known, as well as good data for many of the economic valuations that it ascribes.53 
Indeed, each decision-support tool requires climate information tailored to its specific needs.
Decision-makers need to understand which tool to use in which contexts. However, extensive 
training for decision-makers in this regard is not always feasible given constraints on their 
resources, capacity and time. For all but the largest infrastructure projects, donor-driven 
interventions and national planning projects, the technical, financial and time requirements 
are simply not available or not commensurate to the perceived benefits. Indeed, even simple 
sensitivity testing may be too challenging or time-consuming for many end users. 
It is therefore clear that greater support in using and selecting appropriate decision-support 
tools will be an important step for promoting the greater use of climate information among 
stakeholders, such as influential line ministries with a mandate to decide on trade-offs 
for large, long-term investments. Understanding the context, size and type of investment 
decisions will be important in such a selection process, and will help to determine the level of 
time and financial resources required.54 
Low-regret options and risk screening
Perhaps the main finding from the FCFA case studies is that not every investment and 
decision needs to be based on long-term climate information. This may even be the case 
for many medium- and long-term investment decisions in sub-Saharan Africa, given the 
immediacy of other development priorities and high discount rates. This is not to say that 
climate information should not be considered in decision-making, or that investments in 
promoting the uptake of climate information into long-term decision-making are futile. Far 
from it: climate information should be integrated into any investment or plan where the 
implications and/or secondary impacts are likely to span decadal timescales (whether during 
the lifetime of the project or subsequent to its completion). 
What this points to is the need for robust and easily applicable tools that can identify the 
types of investments and decisions that are likely to require considerable risk screening. 
These needs to span the three distinct types of activities and investments: i) short-term 
interventions that address immediate development needs; ii) short-term interventions 
with long-lived implications; and iii) long-term interventions with long-lived implications 
(see Chapter 2). All three types of activity require different decision-support tools and carry 
different risks associated with a failure to effectively consider long-term climate risks. 





The first category is generally the mainstay of development activities in sub-Saharan Africa, 
requiring little more than ‘low-regret’ measures and basic risk screening. The most relevant 
climate information for these activities relates to weather and shorter-term seasonal climate 
information. While long-term climate information may be relevant to certain investments and 
activities, it is not the primary focus. The latter two types of activity are of most relevance to 
the FCFA programme, given its emphasis on long-term climate information (5–40+ years). 
Here, it is evident that some sort of screening criteria are required – perhaps building on the 
tools listed in Section 4.1. 
However, it may be that some long-term investments are unlikely to require significant 
redesigns or the re-evaluation of planning decisions. Returning to hydropower in Rwanda 
(see Section 3.1), the case study team found that in most cases, even medium-scale 
schemes, the optimum solution to prepare for climate risks in the future is simple low- or 
zero-cost over-design. This recognises that future benefits will be accrued towards the 
end of the economic lifetime of the scheme, which is also when there is the highest future 
uncertainty.55 The clearest need for action on climate information comes in the third type of 
activity. Unquestionably, more complex support tools are required for large-scale, long-term 
hydropower investments, and where considerable changes in rainfall are projected under the 
lifetime of the investment – or where the risks of maladaptation are high.
4.3 Developing the mandate and capacity of boundary agents and 
knowledge brokers
The task of communicating climate information to decision-makers is made more difficult 
by the growing emphasis on communicating the uncertainties associated with climate 
science.56 Often, producers of climate information lack the skills, support and incentives to 
communicate their outputs directly to decision-makers and the public. Therefore, this role 
should rest not only with the producers of climate information, but also with ‘boundary 
agents’ – institutions that act as intermediaries between scientists, policy-makers and 
practitioners. 
There are few organisations in sub-Saharan Africa with either the skills or the mandate 
to play this role. The FCFA case studies showed that the role of communicating climate 
information at the national level is typically mandated to formal science institutions, 
such as national meteorological agencies. These tend to have weak capacity and few 
resources, constraining their ability to collect, analyse and disseminate climate data, which 
is often raw and disjointed (see Section 3.2). At the same time, many existing international 
boundary agents (such as think tanks or international NGOs based in developing countries) 
often lack the necessary understanding of local social and cultural contexts, particularly 
how perceptions of risk differ across sub-Saharan Africa, or the level of trust required for 
their information to be acted upon.57 
Participants across the case studies noted that the information passed to end users – 
whether at local or national levels – often arrives in a form that is overly technical, ill-
matched with decision-makers’ needs, and prone to misunderstanding of the uncertainties 
associated with it. In Malawi, for instance, officials from various ministries noted that the 
Department for Climate Change and Meteorological Services was unable to collect and 
communicate relevant long-term climate information in an easily accessible manner 
(see Section 3.2). The Zambia case study highlighted a clear need for primary climate 
information to be turned into ‘adaptation-ready’ information and guidance in a format that 
decision-makers can act upon. Clogged drain, Zambia






These examples demonstrate the need for developing these countries’ capacities to use more 
analytically rigorous adaptation planning tools, such as considering alternative scenarios 
and information from quantitative models. This will make more complex climate information 
accessible to decision-makers. As previously stated, in nearly all the cases where climate 
information was used at all, it was extremely basic, usually centred on a qualitative narrative of 
future climate change, and often employing only basic, secondary sources of information (e.g. 
national communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
Country-based boundary organisations should be given a clear institutional mandate to 
provide climate information and ensure the most up-to-date information is being used. 
Akosombo dam, Ghana








Chapter 5. What can we learn from the 
approaches used in the FCFA case studies?
Key messages
 y The four FCFA country case studies trialled a number of different tools that bring 
together producers and users of climate information. Insights from the application 
of these may be of considerable use to future knowledge brokers – both climate and 
non-climate related.
 y Workshops are limited in their use. Stakeholders wishing to promote greater dialogue 
between science producers and users should consider at the start if a workshop is 
the best way to engage with them. 
 y Knowledge brokers need: a detailed understanding of the political context they are 
working in and of their end users’ needs; awareness of the advantages and limitations 
of different engagement methods; and a willingness to respond to evolving needs 
during the engagement process. 
 y Processes to engage scientists, policy-makers and practitioners around the uptake of 
climate information into long-term decision-making should be flexible and respond 
to stakeholders’ changing needs.
 y It is not possible to have a significant policy impact, raise awareness or build capacity 
through isolated interventions. Longer-term engagement is needed to have a 
meaningful impact. 
Although the primary intention of the FCFA case studies was to understand barriers and 
opportunities to the uptake of climate information, the scoping phase also provided 
insights into how scientists and policy-makers can be brought together to discuss 
the use of climate information in difficult adaptation decisions. The case study teams 
used a range of different tools to elicit knowledge of the role of climate information in 
long-term decision-making, from ‘serious games’ in the case of Malawi and Zambia to 
participatory co-exploration in Accra and bilateral meetings in Rwanda. This chapter 
reflects on the merits and limitations of different engagement processes from the 
four country case studies, with recommendations aimed at guiding future science–
policy dialogues. It is hoped that these findings will be of use to knowledge brokers 
and producers and users of scientific information both within the climate adaptation 
community and beyond.
5.1 Traditional workshop approaches have limitations 
When designed well, workshops can enable discussion and the sharing of ideas, 
helping to highlight similarities and differences between participants from various 
backgrounds. This is crucial for discussing cross-sectoral issues including adaptation 
and long-term decision-making. Because of their short duration, workshops are also 
seen as flexible and cost-effective; they can be easily designed or modified to meet the 
needs of different groups and organisations.58 
However, all four country case studies showed that the way workshops are designed 
and facilitated is crucial to meaningfully engaging with different stakeholders. Most 
workshops operate a one-way flow of information: knowledge is held by one group 
and communicated to recipients (often in the form of presentations), thus building 
recipients’ capacities. Yet these models often fail to stimulate effective learning and 





knowledge-sharing. Efforts to promote two-way communication, which enables the co-
production and sharing of knowledge, can lead to much greater engagement among 
participants. This is particularly true when different stakeholders are brought together, 
as the Accra–Maputo and Zambia case study teams found in piloting their respective 
co-exploration and ‘serious games’ approaches.
The case study teams encountered other challenges with workshops as a method for 
engaging stakeholders. For two of the case study workshops, fewer than half of the 
expected participants attended, despite extensive preparation by the organisers and 
confirmations from the targeted decision-makers. A combination of a ‘per diem’ or 
‘daily subsistence allowance’ culture – an expectation of financial compensation for 
attendance – and ‘workshop fatigue’ – competition from other workshops – may be 
partly to blame. Experience from one case study highlighted how these factors can 
negatively affect both the number and type of attendee. 
In some sectors, donors and workshop organisers are competing for a limited pool 
of attendees. This creates perverse incentives, for example discouraging people from 
attending workshops where financial incentives – per diems or a daily subsistence 
fee – are not provided. Indeed, feedback from the case study teams highlighted that 
participants experienced workshop fatigue – spending too much time at such events, 
leading to disengagement and tiredness – and saw payments as the main incentive for 
attending. This runs the risk of participants being motivated to attend for the wrong 
reasons, as well as making it difficult to target the people who will benefit the most 
from – and make the most useful contributions to – discussions.
Navigating these challenges is a difficult, yet necessary, process to ensure the desired 
level of attendance, engagement and outcomes from a workshop. Even if these factors 
can be partly overcome, they are still likely to limit the usefulness of workshops. At the 
start of a programme or project, organisers need to decide whether a workshop is the 
best way to engage with their target participants. 
The variety of different approaches adopted by the FCFA case studies highlights 
that there is often more than one effective method of engaging. The Rwanda case 
study team chose not to host a workshop at all, instead opting for a series of bilateral 
stakeholder meetings. The primary aim of the scoping exercise was to elicit knowledge 
of the barriers and entry points to the effective uptake of climate information, which 
did not require extensive capacity-building elements. This method proved to be more 
than capable of doing this; in fact, it allowed participants to delve into details across a 
range of different sectors, while providing opportunities to probe and triangulate the 
main political economy drivers behind long-term decision-making in Rwanda. This 
would have been difficult in an open workshop.
5.2 Focusing on a specific adaptation challenge is important
Another challenge the FCFA case study teams faced was narrowing down the focus 
of their projects to particular adaptation challenges. In designing their approaches, 
each chose to address issues across a number of different sectors and decision-making 
contexts. This was partly in response to the difficulties experienced in finding examples 
of climate information being used to inform current long-term decision-making 
processes in the case study countries. It also reflected the desire of many of the case 
study teams to engage with a wide range of stakeholders. Maputo harbour, Mozambique






While this allowed case study participants to more readily engage with the content of 
the workshops and meetings, and relate problems to their day-to-day activities, it made 
it difficult for the case study teams to delve deeper into specific barriers to the effective 
uptake of climate information in each sector, time frame (see Figure 2, page 12) or 
stakeholder group. While choosing the appropriate level of contextual detail inevitably 
requires trade-offs, lessons from the scoping phase suggest that it may be easier to limit 
the focus to a small number of case studies (even a single case study) and adaptation 
challenges. 
5.3 Engagement processes have to be flexible and responsive
One of the most important lessons learned from conducting the FCFA case studies 
was the need for engagement processes to be flexible and responsive to changing 
needs. To begin with, the case studies sought to uncover examples of where climate 
information had been embedded directly into long-term decision-making. However, 
early on in the process, it became clear that such examples were not easy to identify, 
and in some countries non-existent. Thus, in some places the case study teams 
placed greater emphasis on exploring future development scenarios and generating 
hypothetical examples for different sectors. This allowed the teams to break down 
different elements of the decision-making process, and encouraged participants to 
reflect on their roles and information needs with regard to existing decisions. 
The models of experiential learning used in the Accra–Maputo, Malawi and Zambia 
case studies were designed to allow a safe space for open and frank discussion. 
This is particularly important when different stakeholders are collectively discussing 
weaknesses and failures within the science and policy systems. In general, the case 
study teams found these models of stakeholder engagement useful in helping 
stakeholders from very different backgrounds to understand the needs and interests 
of others. In addition, such two-way engagement processes can help to communicate 
the uses and, more importantly, the limitations of climate information in guiding future 
investments. 
Post-workshop feedback suggested that there are limitations, though. In some contexts, 
the use of hypothetical examples and scenarios restricts the ability of users to relate 
directly to their day-to-day decision-making roles. This is especially true when multiple 
sectors and time frames are used, as this restricts the ability to delve into technical 
details relating to the use of climate information, and encourages generalisations. 
Researchers need to take care to ensure that examples and scenarios match real-
world adaptation challenges. Engagement workshops also require considerable time 
and resources to plan and prepare, not to mention skilful facilitators; these are often 
over and above those associated with traditional knowledge-sharing workshops and 
bilateral stakeholder consultations. 
However, these challenges are largely outweighed by the ability to engage a diverse 
range of workshop participants and break down complex issues with a non-expert 
audience, such as the uncertainties associated with multi-decadal climate modelling. 
Above all, the case studies demonstrated the need to carefully consider the end 
objective and envisage outputs before selecting an appropriate engagement method. 
Not all science–policy dialogues require participatory engagement, such as serious 
games. On the other hand, not all knowledge-sharing and capacity-building objectives 
can be delivered through bilateral meetings. Jamestown, Accra, Ghana





5.4 Long-term engagement is needed to have meaningful impact 
Little happens through isolated workshops. Restricting engagement to one-off activities 
is a common approach to capacity building and knowledge-sharing. Single workshops, 
such as those conducted under the FCFA scoping phase, provide a useful mechanism for 
investigating the drivers of vulnerability and testing potential approaches to addressing 
them. Yet they rarely translate into effective and sustained learning and action. 
This was clearly underlined by the case studies. All four teams highlighted that the 
short time frame of the scoping phase, and the limited mandate for follow-up activities, 
hampered their ability to meaningfully engage with respondents. Feedback from the 
Accra–Maputo case study, as well as the difficulties experienced in coordinating the 
Malawi and Zambia workshops, showed that sustained engagement processes build 
relationships of trust within a network of decision-makers over a longer time period. 
These relationships are necessary for sharing knowledge and developing meaningful 
partnerships for real decision-making processes. 
In thinking through and designing engagement processes, it is crucial to consider how 
different activities are likely to affect change. If the objective is to build capacity, share 
knowledge or inform real development or adaptation decisions, then one-off workshops 
or meetings are unlikely to result in meaningful change. But moving to more meaningful 
forms of stakeholder engagement will not be easy. The responsibility for this lies as much 
with donors as it does with the stakeholders – NGOs, academic institutions and private 
sector entities – who typically run the workshops. All too often, projects are only funded 
for a short time frame, and stretched budgets put pressure to deliver on predefined 
project outcomes. 
Clear knowledge and understanding of the institutional and political contexts that 
participants operate in is also needed among project coordinators. In particular, this 
helps to ensure that the objectives from any intervention – such as promoting the 
greater uptake of climate information in long-term decision-making – are well situated 
within ongoing national and local initiatives. Above all, longer-term engagements 
require considerable time and resources; leaving engagement processes to the very end 







Chapter 6. What are the ethics of promoting the 
use of climate information in decision-making?
Key messages
 y Decision-making processes and needs in sub-Saharan Africa are different to those 
elsewhere, especially Western Europe or North America. Transposing a model developed 
in the latter regions may create ethical challenges, as well as practical ones.
 y When promoting a shift to decisions based on climate information, donors and 
knowledge brokers must explain and justify the moral reasons for taking action on 
longer-term decisions, especially when there are trade-offs against short-term gains. 
 y The people and organisations responsible for communicating climate science should 
be aware of the social value of the information they provide, and the legitimacy of the 
goals pursued by policy-makers. They must adhere to principles of honesty, precision, 
transparency and relevance when communicating climate information.
 y Notwithstanding the need for awareness-raising, consideration should be given as 
to whether efforts to promote medium- to long-term climate information in places 
where there is little to no demand from decision-makers are appropriate and ethically 
defensible.
A number of ethics-related challenges arose during the process of implementing the FCFA 
scoping phase. While this was never a primary objective of the FCFA programme, findings 
from the case studies pose relevant questions of ongoing activities to promote the uptake 
of medium- and long-term climate information: questions that many within the donor and 
scientific communities have yet to reflect on openly. 
This chapter examines these ethical questions and those arising from the programme’s 
wider objectives. It starts by outlining the wider perspectives around development ethics, 
before considering ethics in relation to decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
generation and translation of scientific information. 
6.1 Ethics and decision-making contexts
For the FCFA programme, the central question about development ethics is: to what extent 
is it justifiable to push for the consideration of a longer-term development agenda in places 
where attending to current concerns and crises is a higher priority? Just as importantly, 
should we be pushing a long-term agenda where there is little immediate appetite or 
demand from local and national stakeholders? 
On the one hand, there is a strong case for saying that adaptation to climate change is a 
crucial aspect in the sustainability of any short-term development gains. There is growing 
empirical evidence that a failure to consider adaptation will constrain countries’ economic 
growth and that, without an integrated approach to climate adaptation, the costs of 
meeting basic needs and human development targets will be far higher. Estimating the 
additional costs for adaptation in order to make the Millennium Development Goals 
resilient to future climate change, Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub59 concluded that Africa 
would require international assistance of around US$100 bn a year over the period 2010–
2020, including US$11–21 bn for adaptation investments, above the US$82 bn needed in 
‘baseline’ official development assistance. 





On the other hand, experiences from the case studies help to challenge the presumption 
that including long-term climate information is necessary. From an ethical perspective, it asks 
whether prioritising long-term development perspectives might be at odds with the serious 
existing deficits in meeting basic human needs and finding pathways out of poverty. We 
might ask, therefore, whether donors, producers and users of climate information, knowledge 
brokers and other intermediates should instead prioritise shorter-term actions and 
investments that enhance broader adaptive capacity, which in turn will increase the capacity 
and resources to be able to retrofit decisions later (i.e. addressing the adaptation deficit). 
An economic perspective might reinforce this view, as there may be significant opportunity 
costs and trade-offs in long-term decision-making. Given our tendency to accept heavy 
discount rates for future benefits, how do we justify the costs of present-day actions that have 
benefits spread across much longer time horizons? This is a particularly pertinent question 
when considering potentially maladaptive actions, as actions with high opportunity costs are 
one of the pathways to maladaptation in the future.60 
Nonetheless, there are cases where not accounting for climate change today may lead 
to greater and irreversible costs or risks in the longer term. For example, urban planning 
or infrastructure investments that do not consider climate change may become locked-
in to the maladaptive pathways, limiting future options and exposing societies to 
greater threats in the future.61 This is a real concern in sub-Saharan Africa, where rates of 
economic growth and urbanisation are high.62 
It is precisely this immediacy of development challenges that has led adaptation 
approaches away from their initial emphasis on longer-term, impact-focused models 
and towards shorter-term, vulnerability-based approaches (see Box 5). A vulnerability-
led approach may not be incompatible with longer-term considerations, but the FCFA 
scoping phase activities demonstrate the ethical importance of linking future decision-
making to existing development priorities and short-term benefits.63 
6.2 Addressing ethical challenges
It is clearly important that the interactions between climate change and wider 
development pressures are recognised in promoting the use and uptake of climate 
information. This is particularly true when considering long-term decisions, because there 
Box 5. Vulnerability-led approaches and shorter-term development timescales
Vulnerability-led approaches are underpinned by an awareness that, in many places, deficiencies in adaptive capacity 
are matched by a limited ability to manage and respond to existing climate variability, even before future climate 
change is considered. In such cases, improving the capacity of individuals, communities, companies and governments 
to deal with current climate variability is seen as building the foundation for tackling future climate change. 
For example, managing water resources more efficiently and equitably today is necessary because of the poor 
management and the increasing demands for water in many regions – regardless of the future impacts of climate 
change on water availability. By tackling these existing challenges, water managers will be in a much better 
position to plan for a changing climate. Approaches that deliver immediate development benefits at the same 
time as enhancing wider adaptive capacity underpin the ‘no-regrets’ approach to adaptation. 






may be trade-offs and opportunity costs that can increase exposure to climate risks or 
diminish development opportunities if they are not factored in properly at the outset. 
Often, donors and international agencies do not coordinate activities sufficiently, placing 
conflicting pressures on decision-makers to address different development priorities at the 
same time.64 
Investments and activities should enhance the uptake of science for decision-making 
in sub-Saharan Africa. These should be African-led as far as possible, responding to the 
demands of the region’s policy-makers and the needs of end users. Notwithstanding 
the need for awareness-raising, consideration should be given as to whether efforts to 
promote medium- to long-term climate information in places where there is no appetite 
or demand from decision-makers are appropriate and ethically defensible. As several of the 
case studies recognised, the importance of local and traditional knowledge should also 
not be overlooked in favour of externally generated scientific information. Indeed, local 
partnerships are important for understanding local contexts and overcoming the political 
barriers that affect uptake. 
Keohane and colleagues65 propose five principles for the communication of science to 
decision-makers and policy-makers where uncertainty and risk are high. These principles 
especially relevant to donors, producers and users of climate information, knowledge 
brokers and intermediaries in their efforts to promote the use of medium- to long-term 
climate information in long-term development objectives in sub-Saharan Africa:
 y be honest: specifically, do not intentionally mislead or deceive the audience to manipulate 
policy outcomes
 y be precise in the description of scientific information
 y make it relevant: communicate only the information that is pertinent to the audience and 
has implications for policy
 y be transparent about how the information was produced and reviewed, so that the 
audience can evaluate the science for themselves
 y be specific about the uncertainty in any conclusions.
As well as being demand-led, the generation of climate information should draw on 
scientific establishments in sub-Saharan Africa as much as possible. In practice, the current 
lack of collaboration between these should be addressed, for example through digital 
infrastructure to allow institutions to store and share climate-related data and knowledge.66 
This would require investment in better computers to expand existing databases or build 
new ones. 
Resources are needed to support young scientists in sub-Saharan Africa and provide 
employment opportunities to encourage their involvement in developing climate data. 
Where gaps in scientific capacity exist, strategic partnerships with the international 
community can help. For example, the Coordinated Regional Downscaling Experiment 
(CORDEX) in Africa is an initiative launched under the World Climate Research Programme 
to advance knowledge of regional responses to climate change and feed this into research 
and policy. CORDEX also offers training, outreach and communications.67 Opportunities 
may exist for similar collaborations with related scientific fields, such as refining the 
economics of adaptation and multidisciplinary research on the drivers of vulnerability. 
Above all, there is a need to invest in meaningful relationships with all stakeholders if the 
barriers to uptake of climate information – and ethical issues surrounding this – are to be 
overcome. Building trust is a large part of co-producing climate information.Container ship, Tanzania
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